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Abstract
Pierre Bourdieu’s classical sociology and the actor network based ‘economization’ literature
are often considered contradictory, despite some agreement on the constructed nature of
economic man. Through an examination of the publishing industry, we argue that Bourdieu’s
concept of habitus may offer a useful contribution to the literature on economization. We
examine how those new to a field come to understand their position and the role of material
devices in structuring this. We argue that Bourdieu’s theory, appropriately stated, sheds light
on the tacit assessments made by market agents alongside their involvement in network-based
calculative mechanisms, and allows studies of markets to deal with some persistent criticisms
of the economization programme.
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The ‘anthropology of markets’ programme (Callon 1998, Çalışkan and Callon 2009) has 
highlighted the processes of economization: ‘processes through which activities, behaviours
and spheres or fields are established as being economic’ (Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 370). In 
The Laws of the Markets (1998), the book that kick-started the economization research
project, Callon set out to establish an anthropology of calculation, recognising that
calculative activity is not a taken for granted human ability, but a specific, materially
embedded process dependent upon the performative nature of theory (in this case economics)
in terms of providing ‘frames’ for decisions. For Callon and the literature that followed his
lead, somewhat glibly termed the ‘new, new economic sociology’ (McFall and Osseandón
2014), the economy is a discrete social world characterised by a particular mode of
calculation, where ‘calculation’ refers to the ability to distinguish between and order possible
states of the world, and thereby to ascertain the content and value of goods. Callon argues
that calculative competency must be understood as a ‘socio-technical agencement consisting
of material elements and discourses, competencies and embodied skills, routines and so on’
(Callon 2007, 142); calculation is neither native, nor culturally framed, but the result of a
complex process of organisation. In other words, Callon’s innovation was to ask what kinds
of social interaction make up the economy (McFall and Osseandón 2014), and to suggest that
studies of economization consider the social construction of the economy via an analysis of
the construction of economic agency.
Seeing the economy as a product of framing, or even purification, posits agonistic relations
between the economy and other realms of social life – the creative, the artistic, and the
literary, for example – and poses some awkward questions. How do individuals navigate the
intersections and contradictions between the economy and elsewhere, especially those made
manifest by the peculiar oxymoron of ‘creative industry’? What of the tacit judgements and
cultural constructions that give rise to modes of calculation, beyond the economic? If the
economy is the product of purification, what of those parts of the social that remain un-
purified? What of bodies, sensation, taste, and affect? When it comes to the construction of
economic agency, embodied skills seem to be drowned in the material and technical, the
‘prostheses’ and ‘habilitations’ necessary for economic action (Callon 2008). Entwistle and
Slater (2014) have shown how cultural values may be deflated into a network of relations,
3but at the same time suggest that Callon has been too hasty to dismiss culture, together with
its values, norms, fashions and aesthetic conceptions, as an inadequate, fuzzy explanation.
Cochoy (2014, 119) suggests that we should step beyond an exclusive focus on
‘calculativeness and calculating equipment’ to ‘other ways of agencing cognition’, where
‘agencing suggests the possibility of multiple, coexisting conscious, unconscious and
distributed calculative strategies. It has also been argued that ‘economization’ literature
should be able to take more account of ‘quasi-actants’ such as social norms, mores and codes
(Krarup and Blok 2011). Moreover, different social worlds are distinguished by – indeed, are
the product of – rival calculative practices (Law and Urry 2004), which necessarily overlap
as social worlds collide. Further research is therefore needed on how the social facts of
culture and value apprehended as real by actors themselves (Entwistle and Slater 2014) are
interpreted into processes of organizing, qualifications and exchange.
Entwistle and Slater (2014) suggest that studies of culture may benefit from a dose of actor-
network-theory (ANT). In this paper we reverse the move, and suggest that the ANT-driven
stance of the economization literature (meaning here studies of the construction of markets
and the associated anthropology of calculation), while a powerful heuristic device for the
deflation of socially constructed concepts such as culture or creativity, may on its own
struggle to account for individuals’ evaluations of such things, embedded in complex social
networks of distinction. We suggest the concept of habitus may further develop the figure of
the agent in the economization literature. Although most notably associated with Bourdieu
(1977), habitus has a long genesis, ‘an old Aristotelian and Thomist concept’ (Bourdieu
2007, 10) used in the work of Hegel, Husserl, Weber, Durkheim and Mauss.
We use habitus first of all for its understanding of agency. Rethought by Bourdieu as ‘a way
of escaping structuralism without the subject’ and a philosophy of consciousness (Bourdieu
2007, 10), it is an attempt to ‘account for the systematic functioning of the socialized body’
(Bourdieu 2007, 12). Habitus refers to dispositions that are generative – actively and
inventively able to adjust to situations – and that are acquired through experience and
underpin practical knowledge and reason; while acknowledging that these dispositions are
themselves the product of an internalised or embodied social structure that they encounter.
Second – and more importantly – we use habitus because it is a concept that embodies
classificatory schemes, categories of perception and assessment, ‘principles of vision and
4division’ (Bourdieu 2001). While not directly identifying calculation as part of its role, we
argue that taxonomies and classifications (allied to what is ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘vulgar’) are the
basis for calculation. Bourdieu (1977) illustrates this in his examination of the informed
habitus’ understanding of gift-giving, and in forms of calculation that he sees in the
economies of religion and honour (Bourdieu 2007).
Our understanding and use of habitus, however, is not that of a ‘primary’ habitus (Bourdieu
2006, 157), i.e., the product of family, early socialization, class and education; but rather, a
‘specific’ habitus, i.e., ‘a system of dispositions acquired through a relationship to a certain
field’ (Bourdieu 2007, 90). By a specific habitus, Bourdieu (2006, 100) refers to the habitus
of the ‘priest, journalist, doctor, boxer, scientist’: the development of dispositions ‘to be and
to do’ as a priest, journalist, doctor, boxer or scientist, where a specific habitus incorporates
the particular logic of the field. We articulate here the value of the concept of habitus in
addressing some of the issues identified in the economization literature’s understanding of
agents’ actions. An agent who has internalized the architectures of their field such that they
develop an unconscious ‘feel for the game’ is far removed from the carefully formatted and
curated economic agency of the ‘economization’ literature. Nevertheless, as our study will
show, classifications and taxonomies, as well as networks of distinction, may be embedded in
material devices and calculating equipment, and our analysis presents a nuanced approach to
the ‘agencing of cognition’.
Our paper presents an empirical study of publishing, as individuals adjust to, are configured
by, and navigate the economic, market aspects of a ‘creative industry’. It is well recognized
that those working in publishing face a precarious existence as they juggle the twin concerns
of artistic and commercial logics in the struggle to produce commoditized value (Morgan and
Wood 2013). Publishing, a well-established area of economic activity, is a hybrid field like
many ‘creative industries’ (Caves 2002, Entwistle and Rocamora 2006). It must address the
twin concerns of literary quality and commerciality, resulting in tensions that have long been
recognised by empirical studies (Thompson 2005, Thornton 2004). As with many creative
industries, this division is often handled by the separation of personnel: authors and editors
are generally involved in the literary side of production, and literary agents, sales and rights
personnel with its marketing facets. Changes within publishing, however, increasingly
challenge this division, forcing authors and editors to learn to accommodate the market
element of their work (Thompson 2010).
5By focusing on those new to publishing, we highlight the interplay, or mismatch, between
learned dispositions and more distributed modes of doing and being as individuals encounter
established ‘market devices’ and industry specific modes of valuation and calculation
(Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007). As Bourdieu (2006, 99-100) notes, ‘The specific habitus,
which is demanded of the new entrants [to the field] as a condition of entry, is nothing other
than a specific mode of thought…In reality what the new entrant must bring to the game is
not the habitus that is tacitly or explicitly demanded there, but a habitus that is practically
compatible or sufficiently close, and above all malleable and capable of being converted into
the required habitus’. We examine how individuals are obliged to acquire the ‘nous’ or sens
practique to be able to function within a specific commercial arena, and how ‘economic
behaviour socially recognized as rational arises out of practice’ (Bourdieu 2005, 211).
Newcomers must learn the ‘rules of the game’: the narratives and justifications of creative
and commercial value. Yet they also must learn to work with market devices, such as the
book proposal, to articulate positions in the market and softer claims such as ‘authenticity’,
and to manage local strategies of classification that serve to ‘pitch’ and locate authors to
publishers. For individuals, this involves being able to move from a perspective whereby a
literary or ‘creative’ perspective is dominant, to acknowledging a different logic involved in
adapting to ‘the market’. Our analysis explores the complex interplay of calculation
embedded in and mediated by material devices and the more tacit strategies and judgments of
participants; we demonstrate how both these perspectives illuminate some of the lessons that
those new to publishing must learn as they begin to appreciate that publishing is not just
‘about books’, but is ‘the publishing business’.
In summary, we propose that a carefully specified notion of habitus provides a powerful
addition to the theoretical armoury of ‘economization’, although to do so we must
circumvent some significant obstacles: the criticisms levelled by Callon and Latour against
Bourdieu’s ‘classical sociology’.
Bourdieu and ‘economization’: Two accounts of calculation
Combining Bourdieu with studies of economization might, at first glance, be considered
problematic. Bourdieu’s ‘field theory’ offers a critique of agency centred explanations or
interactionist approaches: structure has an effect independent of agents. Certainly Callon
6(1998, 267) is critical of a structuralist sociology ‘in which actors are immersed and
sometimes drowned’, seeing this as incompatible with the constructivist sociology of ANT.
Latour (1996), still more critical, describes Bourdieu’s sociology as rendering individuals
invisible against the structures of fields. He critiques the arrogance of Bourdieu’s intention to
show that ‘what really goes on…may be very different from what the ‘agents’ think is going
on’ (Schinkel 2007, 710). Bourdieu replied that critics are guilty of a ‘fast’ reading of his
work, construing constraint as determinism (Townley, 2014).
This debate may be construed – and perhaps bracketed – as a squabble over institutional
prestige, or a representation of changing modes of knowledge production: Bourdieu the high
priest of state sponsored, politically concerned sociology, Latour the representative of an
industry driven, networked, ‘mode 2’ institution (Schinkel 2007, Fuller 2000). However,
there is a related methodological element. For Latour, science is propelled by the use of
inscription devices, often visual, around which scientists and resources can gather.
Calculation and the production of knowledge are visible to all who observe the laboratory,
which it is the task of the sociologist to describe (Savage 2009). Thus Latour is a foremost
proponent of the ‘descriptive turn’ in sociology, a turn that when not politically mute, comes
close to lionizing the innovator and entrepreneur (for example Latour 1988). By contrast,
Bourdieu became increasingly politically active, convinced that ‘social sciences cannot
remain bystanders of the social suffering…they have made a living of’ (Schinkel, 2007:711).
Political activism demands analysis of structure and cause, accessible through the analysis of
interview and ethnography.
We suggest that it is possible to find some commonality between these hostile camps. Both
Bourdieu and Callon are critical of homo oeconomicus and question the universality of the
rational economic disposition. Bourdieu (2005, 1) writes that ‘the science of economics’ is a
scholastic fallacy, ‘based on an initial abstraction that consists in dissociating a particular
category of practices, or a particular dimension of all practice, from the social order in which
all human practice is immersed’. Callon (1998) also energized the debate over the
naturalness of economic exchange, emphasizing the importance of addressing ‘who (or what)
actually calculates (and how) when we say that ‘the market’ calculates?’, and asks ‘under
what conditions is calculation possible and under what conditions do calculative agents
emerge’ (Callon 1999, 184). Both Bourdieu and Callon assert that the economic actor does
exist, the product of particular historical conditions. For Callon, however, it comes into being
7as the result of a process of purification. It is constructed and formatted through specific
arrangements, bound up in calculative ‘agencements’ – networks of technical artefacts across
which calculation is distributed. Callon borrows the term ‘agencement’ from Deleuze and
Guattari to signify an arrangement of heterogeneous elements, human, material or theoretical,
all of which have the capacity to act and across which agency is distributed (Muniesa, Millo,
and Callon 2007). Economic evaluations are framed, momentarily stabilized and calculation
made possible in these networks, before frames overflow and must once again be stabilized
(Callon 1998). Economic agency is configured by equipping agents with calculative
‘prostheses’, or adapting (habilitating) the architectures of the material environment to
produce certain behaviours (Callon 2008).
Dismissing the notion of individual calculation as ‘too demanding’ Callon (1998, 4) argues
that economic agent is not person, but a heterogeneous ‘agencement’ (assemblage) of person,
device, and scripts. The ‘market device’ is an artefact of co-ordination, something that ‘holds
together’ a particular network (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007). In financial markets, for
example, fluid networks of economic relations can be stabilized and manipulated –
appresented (Knorr Cetina 2005) – by screens, the stock ticker (Preda 2006) or dealer’s
telephone (Muniesa 2008). Doganova and Eyquem-Renault (2009) argue that business
models are intermediaries or ‘boundary objects’ between the entrepreneur, customers,
investors, and other actors. Models hold together and co-ordinate action; they are hybrids,
using calculation and narrative to envisage, and thereby perform, a future business
(Doganova and Eyquem-Renault 2009). Even rational decision is an organisational
achievement: Cabantous and Gond (2010) demonstrate how rational choice is ‘crafted’ by
trained analysts, theory and artefacts, working to frame organizational decisions and render
them calculable.
For Bourdieu, on the other hand, calculation reflects a sens pratique, the ‘responses of the
habitus, which, when it is in phase with the world, are often so marvellously adjusted to it
that they can make one believe in rational calculation’ (Bourdieu 2008, 184, emphasis
added). His early work with the Kabyle, for example, identifies the complex forms of
calculation involved in the gift economy (Bourdieu 1990). Although this takes the form of
social evaluation rather than quantitative calculation, it involves careful calculation of timing
and estimates of reciprocity. Calculation is a consequence of embodied behaviour born out of
practice, reflective of the habitus of the field. Equally, Bourdieu’s (2000) early work in
8Algeria discusses the development of an ‘economic’ habitus. In pre-capitalist Algeria,
economic dispositions such as calculation, anticipation and accumulation are ‘not really
defined and systematically constituted as legitimate practices’ (Lebaron 2001, 125); certainly
they are not openly acknowledged as such. He outlines the changes that take place as French
colonial powers transformed an agrarian to a commodity based production system and the
changes in practices and habitus that ensue (Bourdieu 2000). In doing so, Bourdieu compares
the traditions of a pre-capitalist society which he sees as alien ‘to the logic of the market’ to
those functioning in a modern economy, and illustrates how economic dispositions fashioned
in a pre-capitalist economy are no longer adequate in a ‘rationalized economic cosmos
imposed by colonization’ (Bourdieu 2000, 17). He talks of acquiring a ‘sprit of calculation’
and refers to the distress of economic agents where they do not have the dispositions required
by an economic order ‘that is for us entirely familiar’, where they appear ‘evident, necessary
and universal’ (Bourdieu 2000, 18). He likens the process to one of a religious ‘conversion’
requiring the ‘apostasy’ of embodied beliefs: it is ‘the conversion of the whole mindset that is
necessary to break with the universe of deeply embodied presuppositions’ (Bourdieu 2000,
23). The ‘economic’ is a reflection of the outcome of practices sedimented and established as
such.
One seemingly formidable obstacle may offer us a way into the topic. It is posed by Callon's
own repudiation of economic calculation as some kind of universally, if differentially,
available cultural resource, on hand to explain differences in the uptake of rational economic
agency among nations and cultures. More particularly, he critiques the idea that cultural
frames offer a basis for calculative competence (1998, 5f). In support of this claim he reads
Gao’s (1998) analysis of the changes in 20th century Japanese management as demonstrating
the weakness of culture as an explanatory device. But as Entwistle and Slater (2014) point
out, Gao shows quite the opposite: the resources that are employed by managers, internalised
by actors and institutionalized within new understandings of labour relations in Japan, are
plainly cultural. Entwistle and Slater state the problem thus: ‘the broader question for Gao is
to ascertain the conditions under which particular meanings and values, such as ‘harmony’
become institutionalised as rules that govern action. This is a good question, but one which
cannot be asked if, as Callon appears to be doing, ‘culture’ is dismissed as a social theoretical
fallacy’ (Entwistle and Slater 2014, 167). Entwistle and Slater point out that Callon is
asymmetrical in his treatment of culture, ready to disassemble but unwilling to ‘reassemble
the cultural’ into the everyday categories through which it is encountered by actors. We echo
9Entwistle and Slater's claim that an ANT analysis must respect the ‘empirical realities of
culture as it is performed and assembled’ (2014, 2); as something experienced in concrete
terms, not as a series of ‘deflated materialities’. In other words, while the notion of
agencement is useful in allowing us to understand the construction of cultural notions of
value, worth, look, or fashion, it eventually relies on a common-sense conception of persons
that cannot adequately deal with such ‘quasi-actants’ (Krarup and Blok 2011). The challenge
instead is to describe diversity in forms of calculation and the different devices which
produce this (Slater 2002, 236)
We would argue that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus allows us to interrogate the conditions
under which particular meanings and values become internalized and indicates an avenue
worthy of more exploration. This is all the more so as both Latour (2005) and Callon (1998b,
250) see purchase in the concept. Indeed, Latour (2005, 209) writes ‘Bourdieu’s notion of the
habitus, once it is freed from its social theory, remains such an excellent concept.’ Habitus is
the disposition of agents through which the social world is apprehended. A specific habitus
develops within a particular sphere of, or field, in which the agent occupies a position. It is
the sens practique, the ability to master what is required to function within a sphere, without
this being the consequence of conscious, rational calculation. It is what Bourdieu refers to as
the ‘feel for the game’, which occurs when the practical activities of the field become
embodied and ‘and turned into second nature’ (Bourdieu 1998, 63). A sense of the game
‘implies an anticipated adjustment of habitus to the necessities and to the probabilities
inscribed in the field’ (Wacquant 1989, 43); an understanding of what is deemed to be
‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable’, ‘likely’ actions, ‘natural’ ways of behaving, what goes
without saying. It is being attuned to the shared habitus, or modus operandi, of a collective
practice. A ‘practical sense of things’ or ‘feel for the game’, is gained through experience and
likened to being a ‘fish in water’, where the habitus is ‘at home’ in the field it inhabits
(Wacquant 1989). Where there is agreement between the habitus and the field, there is no
need for calculation. There is practical mastery.
Habitus, however, is only one of a number of basic concepts for thinking about reasonable
action, intrinsically related to others, such as field, interest or illusio, capital, doxa. Freeing it
from these, as Latour recommends, would be problematic, as an illustration of the interplay
of field, capital and habitus in the ‘economy of cultural goods’ illustrates (Bourdieu, 1980,
1983, 1984, 1985). As a field of cultural production, publishing is a set of inter-related
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agents and institutions, functionally defined by their role in the division of labour, for the
production, consumption and diffusion of books. As with all cultural products, books not only
have economic, but also cultural and symbolic, value. Dependent on the relative prominence
of these values, the field is subdivided into ‘restricted production’ (largely autonomous,
where production and evaluation is for and by other producers, with economic profit
secondary to cultural value); or ‘large scale production’ (a heteronomous field with economic
criteria predominating). In other words, the publishing field, and the position of authors,
literary agents, publishers, and critics, is structured according to the distribution (weight and
volume) of capital, economic, cultural and symbolic, that characterizes it, with each agent
vying to enhance their position (economic profit/symbolic capital) accordingly. The extent to
which they are able to do so is very much influenced by their dispositions or habitus.
Bourdieu (1980, 263) writes, ‘entering the field of literature…is…like getting into a select
club’; with membership of the field ‘a para-doxal commitment to a set of [cognitive and
evaluative] presuppositions’ [doxa], linked to the discovery of stakes and demands [interest,
illusio]’ (Bourdieu 2006, 11).
Making an economic habitus in publishing
Bourdieu (2006) sees habitus as a way to understand ‘mismatches’, citing the example of
Algeria in the 1960s, and developing economies today, between the ‘objectives structures’,
i.e., economic institutions of a colonizing power and ‘incorporated structures’, dispositions
formed in a pre-capitalist world. Our identification of new entrants, or agents talking about
their experiences on entering the publishing field, allows us to identify the mismatches that
take place in relation to a specific, as opposed to a primary, habitus. New entrants, or those
with changing roles, writers and literary editors in particular, are more concerned with the
literary merit and value of their work. They are not so familiar with the commercial aspects
of publishing. However, new authors and literary agents are gradually obliged to come to
understand publishing as being a ‘business’ rather than just ‘about books’. We illustrate this
process, drawing on interviews with 5 authors, 4 literary agents, 4 editors, 4 rights managers,
and 5 publishers based in Scotland (Gulledge 2011). Interviews are supplemented by
observations of the London and Frankfurt book fairs, and conferences and network events
where participants discuss and contest changes in publishing, as well as secondary source
documents about publishing including the trade press.
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The language of classifications
In the economisation literature, classification and categorisation are important mechanisms
for rendering goods calculable; even market-alien notions such as ‘love’ may be performed
as tradable commodities through appropriate mechanisms (Roscoe and Chillas 2014). In the
case of publishing, classifications are a means of making creativity and creative callings
economic. Authors enter publishing largely because they wish to write. Authorship was
described by one author as a ‘calling’ or as a vocation to which the author feels summoned,
with another describing writing as, ‘a walk of life to follow in spite of practical
considerations’ (Author A). Although the roles of literary agent and publisher generally
isolate the author from the process by which writing is made into literary merchandise, an
important element of the experience of authors is their gradual awareness of publishing as a
business and an increasing understanding of the role of the market. For many, there is an
intuitive awareness of a conflict between economic and cultural capital and the tensions this
causes:
There are times when I think ‘why don’t I write a book about lots of sex because
people will buy it?’ I am not entirely against stiletto heels and red lingerie, so is it
illogical of me to want to write something that could be both literary and thrilling?
(Author B).
Here the author makes use of signs and codes – stiletto heels and lingerie – that show an
awareness of the market and ‘what sells’. While there are unlimited possibilities in what may
be written, the disposition of the writer limits and constrains (Bourdieu 2006, 116). Here,
cultural capital predominates over economic.
An important element of learning to operate within publishing involves an awareness of, and
sensitivity to, the categorizations ascribed to manuscripts. Through relations with literary
agents and publishers, authors learn to understand how they are valued and on what terms.
This involves learning the language of evaluation. Following an economy of symbolic goods,
the language of publishing is euphemistic, predisposed to ‘disinterestedness’ (‘art for art’s
sake’): there is the presumption of a disavowal of economic calculation and the maximization
of material profit. Learning otherwise can be very bruising:
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I had heard one of the editors at the house was very ‘professional’ so I thought that
meant she was interested in the work itself and developing it. I guess I didn’t
understand what ‘professional’ meant in publishing. Because I don’t think she even
read anything of mine, she just said ‘OK. Female, Short story. OK, we’ll do that on
the side. Get an Arts Council subsidy for it and it won’t cost anything.’ So I went into
the project feeling bruised and was more bruised by the end of contracts (Author A)
In this example, the author’s work was quickly labelled as short stories aimed at a ‘female’
market. Based on this label the publisher gauged the amount of money to invest in its
marketing and promotion, in this case a negligible amount. ‘Professional’, ‘female’ and ‘short
story’ exist as codes, shorthand for valuations understood within the industry. We might trace
the network-based calculative arrangements that make ‘female, short story’ an object of
lower value, but both the editor and the author recognize the tangible nature of the
categorization. Indeed, the author recognizes her own position to be precarious:
They didn’t know anything about women’s fiction and, while I detest being
categorized in that way, nevertheless that is what I was, and they sort of begrudgingly
agreed to publish my second set of short stories. They were really not keen on making
money on my sort of writing and they didn’t really care about me as a writer, which
was quite a shock. (Author A)
The categorization develops further refinements:
Now to get your foot in the door you have to become a ‘genre writer’ and you don’t
need just one genre, you have to have a sub-genre. So I had to decide whether I was
‘humorous women’s fiction’ or ‘serious women’s fiction.’ (Author A)
The terms used to identify her and her work served to box her into a doubly marginal position
of ‘woman’s fiction’ and ‘short stories,’ neither of which are commercially valuable. The
editor’s assessment of future profit is in turn performative, and the author, having been
described in these terms, feels she is not valued by her publisher. So classifications also
order and construct authors. On the one hand, classifications – and the authors and books to
which they refer – exist as distributed objects with unstable meanings; their objectivity, like
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those of the fashion models’ ‘looks’ described by Entwistle and Slater, exists in a network
form ‘emergent from and sustained by an extended apparatus of interconnected practices and
arrangements’ (Entwistle and Slater 2014, 169). On the other, just as ‘looks’ are perceived as
external cultural objects, even exchangeable, objectified commodities (ibid.) classifications
act as substantial social facts that shape the way the individual comes to regard their work
and themselves through a process of mutual adjustment. Awareness of categories can become
so strong that it informs a self-reported identity:
Now writers have turned into creatures that write for a market. You see this a lot in
children’s books now that everyone has realized there is an enormous market. I met
an author the other day who told me she is writing for 9 to 11 year old boys. I just
don’t get that sort of thinking. I mean how do you know you are writing for
something so specific? But a lot of writers are writing for specific markets now and
they have a very clear idea of sales. But then there are those writing literary fiction
and they are all just dreaming of being the next Pullman. (Publisher A)
The process of categorizing or naming enables the work to enter a calculative space. It is in
this space that a manuscript is connected and compared to a list of other products. The book
can be ‘positioned’, competition identified and consumers targeted. Industry jargon indicates
that these are well established practices, part of the rules of the game that must be absorbed
in order to be a functioning agent within it.
Proposal submissions: the beginnings of calculation
The manuscript the publisher receives is the product of pre-selection; the choice of publisher
determined both by the author’s position in the field, and the publishers in a system of
production and circulation (Bourdieu 1985). Literary agents have to convey to authors ‘the
space of possibilities’ within publishing, in that ‘placing’ a book is a matter of understanding
what sorts of books publishers decide to publish. Again, success is contingent on a process of
learning the unspoken rules. One literary agent describes the importance of knowledge that is
both extensive and includes the subtleties and nuances of ‘insider knowledge.’
To work as an agent you have to learn from the inside all the quirks of publishing,
such as how decisions are made, what's realistic to expect in a given situation, and
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how best to cultivate publishing personnel, from the editor to the publicist to the
cover designer. This includes learning how to ‘place authors’ by comparing them to
other successful authors as part of how to sell a book to an editor. But trying to do
that can also be detrimental if it's not done right. Learning how to go about
comparing a client’s book successfully is tricky. It’s learning to speak a language.
(Literary Agent A)
Here, the literary agent describes learning the beginnings of calculation. Although not
displaying the calculating disposition of those in an economic field, there is still the element
of calculation, performed simultaneously by material devices and the agent’s tacit
assessments of what is best placed where. There is substantial work involved in rendering the
manuscript – a literary form – an economically calculable object, and the literary agent
realizes that her role is to detach, frame and singularize the manuscript for potential
publishers (Callon 1998b, Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 2002). The process involves
detaching a ‘proposal submission’ from the manuscript, associating it within a frame of
‘competing titles’, and ‘placing’ it within a ‘proposed market’. The literary agent
decontextualizes the manuscript as a piece of writing and constructs it as a potential object to
be sold (Callon and Muniesa 2005).
I understand the way proposals have to be packaged. Approaching publishers with a
proposal submission that may be just a two page outline of the book is increasingly
the way that initial contact takes place. The proposal includes notes that suggest the
potential for the proposed book’s market value. This strategy encourages a book
publisher to base acceptance on something less than a finished product. The points
that must be covered in the proposal submission direct very little attention to the
substance of the writing. Instead there is significant emphasis on market value and
potential sales. Proposals cover competing titles, likely markets, and time scales, and
why the author is specially qualified to write the book. Once I realized this is how
books got through to publishers, then it was just a matter of figuring out how to take
the books I really believed in and fill out a form about them in a way that got them a
foot in. (Literary Agent B).
The book proposal becomes a market device, ‘facilitating the conception, production and
circulation of goods, their valuation and construction’ (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007, 4).
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It may be more or less legitimate: its authority is dependent on the perceived ‘accuracy’ of
the assessments, the extent to which they align with the recipient’s view of the field, and the
weight of the authoring voice, namely the symbolic capital the literary agent has in the field.
The book is detached from its author and its substance in terms of writing style and depth of
content, to become attached through comparisons to other books within a specified
calculative space, delineated by comparisons and their potential ‘market’. As Bourdieu (1985,
3) notes, ‘properties assigned to cultural goods are positional ones’. Once again, tacit
assessments of value are objectified by the proposal’s ability to enrol and stabilize claims on
the ‘capital’ of existing authors (Herrero 2010), but as the proposal is developed and the book
placed, the ability to make claims on existing capital through comparison relies heavily upon
the literary agents’ sense of the industry. It is an important element of ‘playing the game’ in
terms of marketization.
Once it's [a book] ready to go out, we play what I jokingly refer to as a ‘parlour game’
to figure out exactly how to position the book to editors. Deciding which successful
authors you want to compare yourself to is at the heart of the game. Publishers really
depend on these ‘comps’ [comparisons] to get a book across to the reps and the
bookstores. There's an art to it. The comparison must be apt. For example, if I am
trying to tell an editor about a book, I’ll position it by comparing it to Trainspotting
but that it will be shelved next to Dan Brown. It's a very entertaining form of name-
dropping. The reason I call it a parlour game is that authors, especially first-time
authors, usually have to get over their reluctance to compare themselves to well-
known writers. But that's how the game is played. (Literary Agent B).
In this description there is the articulation of the process of making goods calculable, the
crucial aspect of which is the decision as to which authors are going to be used as
comparators. As with many cultural fields, a known or recognised name is reflective of, and
bestows the power of, consecration (Bourdieu 1980). Knowing what names to select enters
the manuscript into a calculative space, connecting and comparing it to a list of other
products. The book is ‘positioned’ in terms of competitors and consumers. Placing the
product depends on the structure of capital extant in the field, reading its signifiers (‘Dan
Brown’ for example) as reflecting the relative weight and volume of economic, cultural and
symbolic capital. As capital changes, so do the referents. The ability or competence to
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decipher this, the practical mastery of classification, is a ‘game’ familiar to this literary agent.
Classifications, however, are not set in stone. The field is characterized by struggles over
classifications, thereby conserving or subverting its capital, and is implicitly understood as
reflecting shifting capitals of authors, publishers and agents. Those with a well-adapted
habitus have a mental map or diagram of the field as it shifts and changes.
The proposal, a market device, co-ordinates the publishers’ calculative assessments of the
book as a commodity – how much it is worth, or where it will be sold. Once placed alongside
comparators, the value of which is already known and traceable through stable accounting
conventions, inscriptions which are themselves mobile and easily combined (Qu and Cooper
2011), the potential value of the book may be assessed. The capitals invoked by the proposal
are manifested in equally stable forms, perhaps as sales figures, film rights or book prizes,
and the book on offer can be valued and traded accordingly. Yet the proposal itself is
dependent upon the tacit assessments of the literary agent, the result of her sens practique or
market nous, and equally subject to and testable by the dispositions of buyers. For a proposal
to be successful it must be credible in the minds of others. Interviewees describe their learned
understanding of what is reasonable acquired over a period of time and immersion within
publishing; there is the recognition that comparisons must be ‘apt’. As Bourdieu (2001, 81)
notes ‘social agents who have a feel for the game embody a host of practical schemes of
perception and appreciation…principles of vision and division of the universe in which they
act’. The specific industry jargon indicates that these are well established practices, part of
the rules of the game that must be absorbed in order to be a functioning economic actor
within publishing. The habitus of the publishing field, its evaluative system of perception and
appreciation, is achieved though lasting experience, coexisting with and built upon
classificatory schemes and market devices.
‘Positioning’ in the ‘field of publishing’
Although Bourdieu’s work makes much of positions and its relationship to capital, it offers
little on the processes and mechanisms of positioning. Categorization, placement and
comparisons all aid the process of distinction – the positioning of individual authors, and
collectively, publishing houses and their imprints. ‘Naming’ is the predominant means of
‘positioning’ oneself or others within the field (Callon and Muniesa 2005, Caliskan and
Callon 2010), while categorization is an important element of rendering goods calculable, by
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detaching them from existing signifiers and positioning them within appropriate market
categories (Caliskan and Callon 2010). Here, the processes of meaning, positioning and
categorising are used to inform how the finished product of the book will be positioned to be
sold: ‘This is all just so an editor or [literary] agent can figure out where to slot you in on a
list and decide on a marketing budget.’ (Author A). The claim to ‘authenticity’, for example,
is used as a mechanism for positioning. As one publisher remarks, on observing how authors’
respond to the ‘demands of the market’:
Now I see writers of crime novels saying things like ‘Yeah, I was there at the autopsy,
to do real research’ and things like that. It’s terrible, that writers have to actually look
at entrails to try to get books sold. (Publisher A)
Positioning extricates a singular, personalized object, written in very specific circumstances
for individual purposes, and frames it so that it conforms to expectations, as this rights
manager describes,
We are publishing a book that is very much like Train Spotting. It’s about a guy who
didn’t have a great childhood and he wrote this huge manuscript about it. He
originally wrote it to apologize to his wife and explain why he was the way he
was…why he was a tough guy and treated her poorly. It was huge and written by
hand. We signed it up and were really excited to be publishing it. I remember
thinking, ‘We have taken this guy’s life, this guy’s huge document and we slashed it
down to a small book that will look the part, have the right jacket and be put on
supermarket shelves.’ It’s times like that that you think that’s quite tough. You know
this is somebody’s life; who has written this for a reason. It’s just that we have taken
so much content out and changed it to fit the market and make it sell lots of copies.
Whereas he didn’t write it to make money but now he’s going to make money,
because we changed it around to get it in supermarkets. It is quite difficult to come to
terms with but it’s just the way the industry works. (Rights Manager A)
Having been disentangled from the interactions that prompted its initial writing, the
manuscript is framed to become a commodity; separated from the misery it details, it can be
sold under the sub-genre of ‘misery memoires’. The author’s own experiences must be
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disciplined and kept in place. If he is to be successful he must develop means of ‘coming to
terms’ with this disentangling, a difficult part but necessary part of the publishing habitus.
Using the mental image of a score sheet a rights manager describes how positioning
influences the decision to adopt a manuscript.
This most recent book ticked all my boxes. With foreign rights I knew there would be
interest. It’s a moving story, so there’s a publicity tick. And also it is from an author
based in the UK so there was another publicity tick. And it’s not too ‘foreign focused’
for the supermarkets and bookshops that tend to be quite insular. I knew it wasn’t
going to be a book that we could sell through supermarkets, so we couldn’t do 30,000
copies. So we started off with assuming a mid-list sort of title but one that we would
make money back on. I just want to know that with buying it, we can get money back,
without having to rely on a UK sales team. So with [X], we paid 2000 dollars for it
and immediately, two days later sold it for 25,000 Euros to a Dutch publisher. So
immediately we made money on the book without even printing the book. And then
we sold it to Italy for 15,000 and Poland for 5,000. So immediately [we’re] making
money on it. The author’s making money. (Rights Manager B)
In this example, the rights enter circulation before the book has a material form; the book has
become a commodity form even before it has been published. From the same manager: ‘a
book is a product with a price, just like fish fingers.’
Positioning is coordinated – held together (Muniesa 2007) – by classificatory devices within
the industry. Literary agents rely on daily news updates, and particularly subscription trade
presses that include best seller lists, rights deals and other information for industry insiders. ‘I
read the trade press every day, reading the updates that come through the Bookseller twice a
day, just to see what is happening on rights’ (Literary Agent A). Literary agents also find
themselves embedded in a in a rich tapestry of social networks, which they develop and use
to elicit ‘gossip’ or ‘cultural intelligence’ about publishers, valuing information that allows
them to have a sense of editors’ tastes and find out what material they need: ‘I do a lot of
publishers’ lunches and try to get in a lot of just talking to everyone, even other authors I
don’t represent. I ask about their editors and who’s working with whom’. (Literary Agent B).
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It is inevitable, then, that authors learn to respond to the importance of positioning in the
market and develop an ability to calculate their likelihood of success:
Now that I have had a few short stories published I know the odds about one’s first
novel and how easy it is to become mid-list because you are not successful with the
first novel. It can be quite frightening. (Author B)
In acceptance of the commercial nature of publishing, this author has absorbed the language
of risk and recognizes how calculations of ‘success’ are made. The author has adopted the
language of ranking, the linguistic acknowledgement and recognition of positioning within
a field and its economic consequences arbitrated by the industry’s calculative devices. In
the end, authors recognize that it is better to be with a well, positioned, powerful publishing
house which can maximise the economic potential of an author’s cultural capital to
maximum effect:
‘I just feel like small to medium publishers have no idea what to do with their fiction
list. I felt like an experiment for them; that’s how I saw it’ (Author C).
Discussion: Bourdieu’s habitus and the process of ‘reformatting’
Our focus in this paper has been on the economization and ‘reformatting’ of individuals as
they become familiar with publishing, both as an industry and as a field in the Bourdieusian
sense (Çalışkan and Callon 2009). We have made use of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, 
suggesting that it might be usefully allied with studies of calculative agencies and
agencement in order to further our understanding of varied means of ‘agencing cognition’
(Cochoy 2014) and to appreciate, within a framework of socio-materially mediated economic
action, how individuals might cope with the positions of distinction and capital embedded in
such material artefacts as the proposal (Herrero 2010). Although habitus does not come
without some confusion (Brubaker 2004), empirical accounts illustrate that there is both
complexity and subtlety in the concept, such that habitus serves as a useful analytical tool to
illuminate the understanding of new entrants within book publishing. Our emphasis has been
on what has been involved in acquiring a specific ‘economic habitus’: in acquiring a
familiarity with the commercial aspects of publishing and the demands of the market. We
label it as such because the entrants we present are familiar with the literary or creative
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aspects of writing. But it is only through an understanding of publishing as being an
economic – not just literary – activity that individuals acquire a ‘publishing habitus’ or an
embodied feel for the game and become able to manage the calculative artefacts and
classificatory schemes on which economic action are built.
The habitus is, therefore, the product of the embodiment of the structures of the field of
publishing including the distribution of capital within the field. As agents entering the field,
newcomers have to appreciate the particular form which capital takes and the nature of
competitive struggles in the field. Authors and literary agents must develop this habitus.
While authors may be more protected from the exigencies of the commercial elements of
publishing, they are still aware of positioning within a market, the importance of genres that
allow this, and this awareness has an impact on both their self-understanding and presentation
of their work. The literary agent is much more directly involved in the process of making
goods calculable, in other words in rendering the field's regimes of distinction into the
material devices that hold market networks together (Muniesa, Millo and Callon 2007). The
agents' role is to define the writer by abstracting them within a proposal, placing them within
a frame with other writers, and defining their competition. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus aids
our understanding of this ‘practical mastery’; the embodied ‘feel for the game’, reflective of
long immersion, such that it becomes ‘second nature’. As Bourdieu (2006, 11) notes,
‘because it takes place…gradually, progressively and imperceptibly, the conversion of the
original habitus, a more or less radical process (depending on the distance), which is required
by entry into the game and acquisition of the specific habitus, passes for the most part
unnoticed.’
The concept of a shared ‘publishing’ habitus also helps us understand how agents in different
positions come to understand the ‘field’ as a system of strategic possibilities. A field is a
social space of structured differentiated positions mapped according to volumes of economic
and social capital. Habitus allows this space of positions to be retranslated into a space of
position-takings. Both authors and literary agents come to see, first, that they have positions,
or they need to position their clients, and in doing so authors and literary agents come to see
themselves and others relationally – both in relation to other authors, but also in relation to
the categories that are laid out for them by ‘the market’. Such positioning is essential in the
construction of rational market agents.
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A focus on the construction of calculation, on who calculates and how, and under what
conditions calculative agents emerge (Callon 1999, 184) situates rational action as embedded
in organisational work. For Bourdieu, on the other hand, ‘rational action’ depends on
dispositions and the specific field that produces them. As Entwistle and Slater (2014, 166)
note, the challenge is to ascertain the conditions under which particular meanings and values
– here signifiers such as ‘women's fiction’ or ‘Dan Brown’ - become institutionalized as rules
that govern action. How, in other words, can a proposal marks with the signifier ‘Dan Brown’
enrol shelf space in distant supermarkets, in a way that one marked ‘women's fiction’ cannot.
Publishing professionals are able to understand and use market devices such as classifications
and proposal submissions to place a ‘product’ in a space and thereby locate its cultural, and
its potential economic, capital. The ability or competence to ‘play the game’, the practical
mastery of classification, is indicative of a publishing habitus. While being aware of
classifications and thus being able to adjust to, or adopt them is a conscious process; the
habitus refers to the adaption and learning that takes place below the level of consciousness,
whereby the behaviour of thinking in terms of placing and classification becomes adopted ‘as
second nature’. It is a practical sense is reflective of someone who has incorporated the sense
of the game without having to deliberate (Bourdieu 2006).
Just as Callon (1998) suggests that the homo oeconomics is performed, so there is also a
suggestion of performativity in the concept of habitus. Habitus ‘performs’ the individual, in
the sense that that practical knowledge and actions are structured by the habitus, while the
habitus is also formed by the practical knowledge and actions.
The traffic between theories is not all one-way, however. Just as habitus may add to our
understanding of economization, the corollary is also apparent. Bourdieu’s analysis,
however, is deficient in its understanding and presentation of material objects, especially in
the form of apparatus and prosthesis that become the incorporated element of the habitus.
The role of evaluation measures and mechanisms i.e. the very devices that ensure that capital
in whatever form may be registered and assessed are given no focus. We have thus attempted
to show how devices and calculative frames influence dispositions. On coming new to
publishing, without such tools, writers and literary agents are not agenced to function within
it; acquiring them is part of developing the ‘economic’ habitus needed for publishing, a
necessary complement to the literary. These devices enable individuals to cast an
instrumentally rational eye on what is produced and how they may be placed. It is only
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through the accommodation of author and literary agent to these devices and their mutual
adjustment that a publishing habitus materializes. Authors, literary agents, editors, rights
managers, lists, book proposal submissions all combine to create an agencement that,
together with editors’ profit and loss accounts for each book and annual reviews of sales per
imprint and publishing house, constitutes the distributed agency that is publishing. Agency is
not possible absent the many material and market devices which construct classifications and
positions.
We have noted the telling critique offered by Entwistle and Slater (2014) and, in a different
form by Krarup and Blok (2011): powerful though the notion of agencement is, it places
much emphasis on the agencement, reducing here the appreciation of artistic worth to a
distributed agency comprising calculations, inscriptions and classifications. Yet, while
classifying, positioning, or making claims on existing capital within the field, agents work
with tacit, realist assumptions of concepts of worth. We propose that Bourdieu’s concept of
habitus provides a useful complement to actor-network explanations, providing a means of
‘re-inflating’ or re-assembling cultural valuations in the calculations of actors. Seeing, with
Bourdieu, calculation as an unconscious evaluation of field positioning and the availability of
capital, at the same time as distributed, quantitative calculation provides, we suggest, a
valuable complement to existing literature on the process of economization. In this sense it
supplements Callon’s (2007, 142, emphasis added) earlier recognition that calculative
competency must be understood as a ‘socio-technical agencement consisting of material
elements and discourses, competencies and embodied skills, routines and so on’.
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